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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
, , 11JIJJ; /' FOGG, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
LOllDA F. FOGG 
DP.fendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 1900!+ 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant Ravmond E. Fogg appeals a decree of 
divorce and distribution of marital assets entered in the 
District Court for the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
Countv, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge Pro 
Tel'l. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The appellant Raymond E. Fogg, plaintiff bel0w, filed 
a co!'lplai.nt for divorce and distribution of marital assets in 
<lie District Court of Salt Lake County on December 5, 1981. 
(R. ;J). Trial was hi'!ld in the same Court on May 2, 1982, the 
Honnrahle Raymond S Uno, Circuit Judge, sitting as District 
Pro TPm. The appellant was grantPrl a decree of divorce 
which neither the appellant nor responciPnt cont0sts. ThP 
Court, on the nth dA.y of Jan11arv, l<lR3, signPrl H1P dpcr<'(' n[ 
divorce which was entered on the 10th dav of Januarv, l<lR3. 
motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
filed (R. 101) but abandoned hy the appellant. Notice of 
Appeal was duly filed on the '1th day of Fehruary, 19R3. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A 
11/A.c; 
The appellant Raymond E. Fogg does not contest the 
decree of divorce, which was granted to the appellant in the 
instant case, hut appeals onlv fro!'l so m1ch of the decree of 
divorce as divided the marital estate of the parties and 
reversal of the decrPe and remand for rehearing in the District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was awarded 11. decree of divorce froEJ the 
respondent, the Court finding !'lental cruelty as the justifiahle 
groun<ls. (R. 91). The appellant an<l respondent were married 
on February 14, 1975, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and no 
were born as a result of the marriage. (R. 90, 91). The 
partias hrought into the marriage propertv they ha<l acquirerl 
prior to the tine they got married, both parties in 
!'liddle vears. (T. lq, 20, 39, 40). The trial court awaY"ded 
the appellant a 1CJ77 Ford pickup truck with s'i<->11, a 1°77 
trailer, aiuminun bon.t, Rnrl thPr personRl items. The 
-2-
'" ,,1dPnt was awarded a 280Z Datsun automobile, a vacation 
: 111 l1nving an equit;1 of $2,800.00 and valued at $5,200.00, 
"1·,, s hnnds and other persona 1 it eras. (R. q6-98). The 
principal issue in dispute was the equity in a three-bedroom 
home located at 1243 \/est 600 South in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The value of the home was appraised at $44,8q0.00, which was 
apparently accepted bv the Court and not controverted in the 
evidence. (T. 8) (Defendant's Exhibit 1). The mortgage at the 
time of trial against the home was $11,243 .OO. (T. 12). The 
appellant hrousht the home into the marriage and at the time of 
the marriage the home had a value of $22, 205. 00. (T. 11). 
Appellant paid between $5,000 and $6,000 for additions to the 
horJe from his Navy pension (R. 20) and the respondent paid 
$R,OOO towards the home out of funds that she brought into the 
!'larriage. (T. 8, 26). The respondent purchased a $7,500.00 
plus value Datsun autnMobile (T. 13) which she paid for out of 
her funds and value from other vehicles. (T. 39). The 
appellant liad a 1977 Ford true!': which he had paid for with an 
old camper, and an old truck. (T. 44). The income of the two 
parties who work is approximately the same. (T. 44). 
Appellant works as a mail carrier and respondent is also 
making the sane as appellant. The trial court awarded 
1 i11rlgnent in the decree in favor of the respondent in the SUM 
f and gave thf> hor:ie to the appelLrnt. The com:t 
-3-
ordered that the appellant satisf:· thP juclgrwnt hv paving th" 
sum of $666.116 on Janw1rv 5, lQR3, ctncl PRch And pvpr•1 montli 
thereafter until January 5, 19Ri>, or thP s11m of $7,CJflQ.CJ;>. (\" 
January 5, 1984, the entire balance on the ohligation was to 
become due and pay ab le. (R. 9 7) . Interest was ordered pay ab le 
on the judRment heginning July 5, 19R3, at 12 percent per 
annum. (R. 97). 
The hearing on the divorce 1rnd distribution of 
property was held on May 21, 1982. Th<" appellant testified 
that after mortgage payment and other expenses he hacl 
funds of $158.10 per month over his postal pay. (T. 22). 
Appellant also had a Navy pension of hetween $500 and $600 per 
month to which the respondent made no legal claim. (T. 23, 
33). The American International Vacation Plan which the Court 
awarded to the respondent had an equity of $2,ROO.OO hut the 
plan sold for and had a value of $5,200.00. (T. 31-32). The 
value of the home, less the value at the time of the marriaBe, 
subtracting the outstanding mortgage, the equity in the home at 
the time of the divorce was $11,455 .00. The judgment of the 
Court in favor of the respondent in the sum of $10,543.90 plus 
interest is virtually the equity in the home that had heen 
developed during the marriage to the respondent, Tl-i<> orir,inal 
minute entry !'lade by the Court after rhf' J-ieqring on "1'1.v 21, 
1 'lR2, awarded A.n Pquitv ici th<" ho!'H0 to t'1e rPsr>onrlPnt to he 
-4-
"'tPrmined hy the Court. (R. 17). On November 23, 1982, 
1 i11r\ nade a subsequent min11te entrv hased on a motion of 
, , , pnndf'nt 's counsel and awarded a judgment in favor of the 
rPspondf'nt in the sum of $7,Q97.40 at 12 percent interest. 
(!'.. f\O). There were letters and coru:iunications ex pa rte 
het11een co11nsel and the court subsequent to the minute entry. 
(R. Rl-85). Counsel for the appellant in one letter to the 
Court (R. 81) made the following statement. 
"I am concerned about the projections made 
bv Mr. Bovee that are bevond the record and trial 
that were had the Court. I would 
hope the Court could find tine for Mr. Boyce and 
I to meet you to review these matters to see 
if they can't he resolved." 
The minute entry also indicated that the value of the vacation 
program was still open for question. (R. 80). Thereafter, the 
Court entered the decree with the judgment previously mentioned 
conteined therein. No additional opportunity was afforded 
cnunsel to have evidence presented to the record or to test the 
11aluation communicated to the Court subsequent to the hearing 
nf Mav 21, 1982. 
-5-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT EUTERED flY THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR 
OF THE RESPONDENT FOR THE Et;UITY IN THE HOME OF 
THE PARTIES WAS I!IPROPERLY ENTERED BErAIJSE: (A) 
VALUATIONS ON THE ASSETS OF THE !1ARRIAGE \If.RE 
MADE EX PARTE TO THE COURT WHICH AFFECTED THE 
COURT'S JUDGMENT AND \/ERE NOT A PART OF THE 
RECORD WHICH DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LA\J; 
(B) THE JUDGMENT RESULTED rn A DISPARATE AWARD TO 
THE RESPONDENT. 
A. Valuations on The Assets of the Marriage \len° 
!lacie Ex Parte to the Court Which Affecteci The 
Court s Judgment and Were Not a Part of the 
Record \1hich Denieci Appellant Due Process of Lav. 
The evidence of record showeci that the home in 
question vas owned by the appellant prior to the marriage of 
the parties and that at the time of the marriage of the partiPs 
was valued at $22,205.00. (T. 11). The value of the hol!le At 
the til'le of the trial was $44,890.00. (T. 8). The outstanr1ing 
mortgage against the property was $11, 2 30. 00, leaving an eq11it:.· 
in the home attributable to the marriage of the parties of 
$11,455.00. Subsequent to the marriage of the parties the 
was put in joint names (T. 20) and both parties contributed to 
the remodeling and improvement of the home. The respondent 
contributed $8,000.00 in cash to the marriage which was 
utilized in part on the hor.:Ie. (T. 8). The apnr>l lant also 
contrihuted in excess of $6,000.00 for additions to the home, 
as Hell as paving the mortgage. (T. 20). (0nsecptPntl:1, tlw 
-n-
1., < LivP positions of the pnrtif's as to the appreciation of 
, "" ,,q11it:1 <luring the marriage was Rpproximately equal. If the 
cc111it:1 in the home werf' dividf'r1 equally the appellant would 
1·eceiue $5,227 .SO as would the respondent. The trial court 
apparently initially believed that the respondent should 
rF>ceive out of the equity the amount of cash she contributed to 
the marriage and the minute entry enterf'd on November 23, 1982, 
set thP. judgment for the respondent at $7 ,997 .40. (R. 80). 
Subsequently, in the decree of divorce the court awarded 
respondf'nt judgment against the appellant in the sum of 
$10, SLd. 90. (R. 97). The monthly payout was set at $666. 66 
which would have been appropriatf' for a monthly payout of the 
original amount of the judgment entered in the Court's minute 
entry. However, the judgment then called for a "balloon" 
payment to become due and payable on the 5th of January, 1984. 
(R. 87). The balloon payment would be approximately 
$2,500.00. This was not contained in the minute entry and 
App11.rentlv bears no relationship to what was the evidence of 
recor<l in the testimony of the parties or the proffered 
exhibits. In a letter that was sent by respondent's counsel to 
'1Dpf'llant's connsel and also to the tri11.l judge and which was 
inclu<ler1 in thf' record on appeal (R. 81, 82), it is stated that 
1!1p <'quitv in the home after subtracting the pre-marital equity 
'"I 1•10rtgage bal!mce was $25 ,441. 79. In reality, the Pq11ity is 
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$11,455.00. $44,890.00 less mortgage, $11,230, lPss ''aluati,, 
at the time of narriage. Consequently, the Court hrirl heforp " 
valuation figures that were not a matter of record anrl hrirl not 
been subjected to cross-examination or anaysis during the 
trial. Other information was also contained in the lettPr of 
respondent's counsel and it was asserted that respondent would 
settle for some $10,000. This figure appears to he the 
approximate figure the trial judge seized on in awarding 
respondent judgment. Counsel for the appellant wrote the court 
directly and protested the projections made by rPspondent's 
counsel that were the record and trial matters that 
\1ere held he fore the court." (R. 83). Counsel also asserte<l 
the problems with the payout formula and the impact that 
anything different than the Court's minute entry would have nn 
appellant. Appellant's counsel expressly requested that there 
be a hearing with the Court to have the matter resolvf'd. 
(R. 84). No such hearing was forthcoming and thf' Court 
apparently entered its judgment based on Mattf'rs outside the 
record. 
It is Hornbook law that the trial court cannot 
determine matters not in evidence. SRe, BarbPr v. Flvnn, 62R 
P.2d 1151 (Okla. 1981). Appellant has never had the 
opportunity to cross-examine or challenge the evidencp 
submitted ex parte by the respondent in respondent's 
-fl.-
''""'nicntion of llovernber 24, 1982. (R. 80-82). In State v. 
23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970), this Court 
consiclererl a proceeding that involved an effort to deprive a 
1J<1ther of the guardianship of her children and to deprive her 
of parental rights. In reversing the trial court's action, the 
Court helrl that it denied due process of law for the trial 
court to consider a social file in making its judgment which 
was not a part of the recorrl. Citing supporting authorities, 
23 Utah 2d 414, n. 8, the Court remanded for a new hearing 
observing: 
In the instant action, the use of the social 
file was a denial of due process of law, since 
appellant had no opportunity to know, 
cross-examine, explain or rehut this secret 
evidence. 
The holding of the Lance case is applicable to the 
circumstances of this case. There was no stipulation that the 
Court could reopen the trial and accept otherwise incompetent 
evidence. Further, the circumstances show that the appellant 
was clearly prejudiced by the new communications with the 
Court. l!ost recently, in Girard v. Appleby, __ P.2d 
(Utah, No. 17662, March 11, 1983), this Court held in a 
different context that a similar process was improper. The 
Court said: 
It lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to grant a motion to reopen for the 
p11rpose of t11king additional testimon;1 after the 
case has been submitted hut prior to entry of 
-0-
judgment. The court shoulrl consider sucl-i a 
motion in light of all th0 circumstances and 
grant or deny it in the interest of fairness and 
substantial justice. However, no such discretion 
is afforded the court to reopen the case 
sua sponte. Preservation of the integritv of the 
adversarial system of conducting trials precludes 
the court from infringing upon counsel's role of 
advocacy. Counsel is entitled to control the 
presentation of evidence, and should there be a 
failure to present evidence on a claim at issue, 
it is generally viewed as a waiver of the claim. 
(Footnotes ooitterl). 
It is, therefore, submitted that the Court should remand the 
matter to the trial court for additional hearing to determine 
whether the parties should be allowed to reopen and present 
additional evidence, or, in the alternative, whether the 
Court's judgment should be changed to reflect the evidence at 
trial as expressed in the Court's minute entry of November 23, 
1982. (R. 80). 
13. The Judgment Resulted in a Disparate Award to the 
Respondent. 
It is respectfully submitte<l that the actions of the 
trial court in its decree awarding a judgment to the respondent 
in the sum of $10,543.90 and awarding a pavout in excess of 
$666.00 per month awarded to the respondent a disproportionate 
share of the equity of the home. As noted ahnve, the actual 
equity in the hone that was attributable to the marriage of the 
parties was $11,455.00. The Court a1rnr<led a specific judgrnent 
in favor of the respondent of $10,543.QO with 12 percent 
-10-
,., tn cor.imence Julv 5, 1983. The interest pavment 
,c'I, ,,,.,1 the July period and the time for the January halloon 
'" i:wnt would be approximately $265 .00 and if carried for a 
:>er ir•d un ti 1 appellant could oh ta in a loan to make a payout 
would completely consume the equity in the home attrihutable of 
the f-drties. (R. 83-84). Thus, the effect of the Court's 
judgrient was the award on the equity in the home to the 
respondent. The other property awarded to the parties 
approximately balances out. There is no apparent justification 
for the exceptionallv heavy auard of the P.quity to the 
respondent. Appellant was granted the decree of divorce and 
there was no special fault attributable to the appellant. 
kespondent is employed earning an income equivalent to the 
appellants. This Court has noted that there is no fixed rule 
for determining the allocation of property. Hamilton v. 
Hariilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1978); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
lg80). Rather, the award should be based upon the equities of 
the case with a view towards assisting the parties in 
reconstructing their lives. DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 
P.2d 221 (1967); Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1 Q74); Reed v. Reed, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979); Hacking v. 
620 P.2d 71 (Utah 1980). In SP.arle v. Searle, supra, 
hing upon ncDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 
-11-
(1951), this Court observed that in making an equitahlP 
property settlement the following factors were appropriate fnr 
consideration: 
(a) the amount and kind of property owned hv the 
parties; (b) the property accumulated during 
their marriage; (c) the ability of each to earn 
money; (<l) the financial conditions and 
necessities of the parties; (e) the standard of 
living of the parties; (f) the health of the 
parties; (g) the duration of the marriage; (h) 
what the wife gave up bv way of marriage; and (i) 
the age of the parties. 1' 522 P.2d at 698. 
Looking to the factors referred to in the McDonald decision, 
there are no special equities favoring one party over another. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the trial court erred in 
awarding the judgment in favor of the respondent which 
effectively consumes the equity in the home of the parties and 
which substantially favors the respondent over the appellant. 
This Court should reverse and require a new hearing, or, in the 
alternative, order that judgment be afforded the respondent 
only in the sum of $5,727.50, which would he one-half the 
equity in the home. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE A\IARDED INTEREST 
ON THE JUDGMENT AND SHOULD HAVE ALLO\IED APPELLANT 
TO PAY OUT ANY JUDGMENT IN EVEN INC:REtlENTS. 
The trial court awarded 12 percent intere>st on the 
judgment given the respondent with the interest to commence on 
July 5, 1983. There is no justification of record to sustain 
-12-
i"'nnl of interest which, in effect, further extends the 
'''"'"'"! of the equitahle interest in the home of the parties 
which was awarded to the respondent. If appellant failed to 
sRtisfy the judgment in accordance with the Court's direction, 
then interest might be appropriate but in the absence of any 
default on the part of the appellant, the award of interest is 
punitive. See Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), 
where the trial court had awarded interest payable to one party 
on the equity in a home but on appeal this court held no 
interest should be paid. 
It is further submitted that by requiring the full 
amount of the judgment to become due and payable in January, 
1984, thus requiring the appellant to make a balloon payment, 
the trial court acted inequitably. There is absolutely no 
evidence of record that the appellant has any assets, liquid or 
otherwise, that are expeditiously available to satisfy the 
judgment. The testimony of record showed that the appellant 
had only $158.10 out of his salary after making appropriate 
µavments and satisfying expenses. The $666.66 payment as 
ordered by the Court would require the appellant to 
significantly adjust his life style and to borrow money or take 
mnney from his Navy pension, which was not the subject of any 
l'im hy the respondent. By requiring a balloon payment, the 
'11urt has imposed a punitive obligation far beyond the economic 
-13-
wherewithal of the appellant to meet the ohligatinn. Th 0 r 0 ; 
no showing of any need for the judgment to be satisfied bv a 
lump sum payout. No testimony was offered at trial to show Rn' 
particular need that the respondent had that would require siic! 
a special payment. The only way that appellant could 
effectively meet the balloon payout would be to borrow monev at 
a substantial rate of interest which would further jeopardize 
the already difficult economic situation of the appellant. 
Although the trial court has considerable latitude and 
discretion in the disposition of property and the judgment 
should not be changed lightly, where a manifest injustice or 
inequity indicates a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will 
reverse. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1977). This 
Court should modify the judgment, if the Court determines the 
judgment is otherwise appropriate, to provide for no interest 
on the judgment and for a reasonable incremental payout. It is 
submitted that this could better be determined by remanding the 
matter to the trial court for further consideration. 
POINT III 
THE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD WAS TO 
SIGNIFICANTLY INFRINGE UPotl APPELLANT'S NAVY 
PENSION WHICH \JAS IMPROPER AS A HATTER OF LAW AND 
WAS BEYOND ANY CLAIM MADE BY THE RESPONDENT. 
The appellant, prior to his rnarriagP to thP respondPnr 
had completed a lengthy tour of service with the United State• 
-1-'I-
,rnr! had retired. (T. 20). The appellant's Navy pension 
relativelv being between $500 an<l $600 per month. 
!T 33). The respondent made no claim to any part of 
rlppellant's pension in the pleadings and expressly rejected any 
claim to the pension at trial. (T. 32). Appellant retired 
from the Navy July 3, 1969 (T. 32) and the marriage of the 
parties occurred February 14, 1975. (R. 2). It was, 
therefore, improper for the trial court to enter in its decree 
any award to the respondent to any part of the appellant's 
pension either directly or indirectly. 
In McCarty v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court held that upon dissolution of a service 
member's marriage, federal law precluded the courts from 
dividing a service member's retirement pay pursuant to state 
divorce laws. The Court concluded that Congress had 
established a comprehensive military personnel program 
providing for retirement pay. The application of state 
property laws conflicted with the military retirement scheme 
which is designed to reward the retiree for his military 
service. The Court detArmined that conflicts between competing 
state and federal policies would impair the objectives of the 
federal program as a state decree could intrude upon the 
·,ngressional direction. It is apparently because of the 
cRse that respondent's counsel correctly made no claim 
-15-
to t!-.2 appellant's pension. On Fehruarv 8, l'l82, CnngrPs' 
modified the effect of the McCartv decision bv enactinR the 
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, P.L. q7-252, 
97th Congress, 10 U.S.C. 1408(c)(l), as amen<led hy 1002 of 
the referenced Act. That Act has no application to the instant 
case. For the Act to be applicable to a military pension, the 
spouse must have been married to the service member for ten or 
more years, during which time the service member must have 
performed ten or more credible years of militarv service. 10 
U.S.C. 1408(d)(2), as amen<led by§ 1002 of the reference<l 
Act. The purpose of the Act was to give the spouses of 
military personnel, who have shared in the family problems and 
military service of the uniformed member, an opportunity to 
share in the benefits upon the <lissolution of marriage. Since 
the respondent does not fit within the Act the standards of the 
McCartv decision are applicable to the appellant's pension. 
This Court's recent decision in Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah lq82), allowing the trial court to award a 
wife a portion of a husband's retirement henefits, is not to 
the contrary, since that decision involved a civilian employee 
of Hill AFB, whose pension would not he subject to the 
protections of the McCartv decision or the Unifnrm Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act. However, to r:he PXtPnt that 
trial court would attempt to directly apply Utah law and the 
-16 -
.,, 1l1l•· apportionment concept of the Woodward decision so as 
.i[ lncate to the respondent a portion of appellant's pension, 
·er to so structure the decree that the effect was indirectly 
the saroe, the trial court exceeded its authority as a matter of 
law. It is respectfully submitted that the action of the trial 
court in the instant case did intrude upon the appellant's 
pension. The uncontradicted testimony of the appellant was 
that after his expenses and exclusive of lunches he had $158.10 
per month to live on. (T. 22). The effect of the Court's 
judgment in favor of the respondent requiring the appellant to 
pay $666.66 per month on the judgment of $10,543.90 and to make 
a balloon payment plus interest was essentially to take a 
portion of the appellant's retirement pay in violation of the 
t1cCartv decision and federal law. Therefore, the decree should 
be modified to allocate the liability to the parties without 
reference to appellant's pension. This Court should remand for 
further consideration by the trial court without reference to 
the appellant's Navy pension. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case show that the trial court was 
unjustifiably generous in awarding the marital estate of the 
r:Ml iPs to the respondent. Further, the Court's judgment was 
•cised upon matters occurring after hearing, apparently 
cnrurnunicated to the Court ex parte and under circumstances that 
-17-
violated due process of law. The decree as actwd l'r PntPred 1,, 
the Court further violates the standards of equitable 
apportionment of the marital estate of the parties as 
previously articulated by decisions from this Court and 
intrudes upon the appellant's Navy pension in violation of 
federal law. This Court should reverse and remand for further 
consideration with direction that the judgment previously 
awarded by the trial court be vacated and the equitable 
interest of the parties in the former home of the parties be 
divided equally with respondent to receive judgment for her 
portion to be paid out on a reasonable incremental basis that 
will not unduly burden the appellant or intrude into 
appellant's Navy pension. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Appellant 
